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Disease surveillance forms the basis for response to epidemics. Covid-19 provides a modern 
example of why the classic mantra of “person, place, and time”, remains crucial: epidemic 
control requires knowing trends in disease frequency in different subgroups and locations. In 
this piece we review key epidemiologic concepts and discuss some of the preventable 
methodologic errors that have arisen in reporting on the Covid-19 crisis 
Numbers vs rates 
By ‘frequency’ we mean the attack rate over a defined time period: the number of identified 
Covid-19 cases (numerator) divided by the population size (denominator). See Table 1 for 
abbreviations and definitions. The size and source of the denominator is important; for 
example, a headline proclaiming “Italy surpasses China” which is based on total case counts 
is misleading because, compared to Italy, China has about 24 times the population; it is also 
younger in age distribution, and covers 32 times the area with far more extensive geographic 
and ethnographic diversity. Thus, even if the test is perfect, case count comparisons and their 
trends across populations and places should be replaced by rate comparisons when deciding 
which countries are 'in the lead', if and when we should 'lockdown', what to do when the 
lockdown is over, and whether waiting for herd immunity is an option. 
Counts can be useful to show when incidence is starting to recede as public health measures 
take effect in a particular population. As we write, the shape of the portrayed trends in case 
counts enables us to see how the UK, France, Italy, Spain are currently on similar trajectories, 
whereas Korea and other Asian countries are ‘flattening the curve.’ Still, graphs of case 
numbers cannot be used to say that one country is ahead of another. For example, the 
headline “the United States is now the epicenter” of cases does not reflect that the U.S. attack 
rate was about a fifth that of Italy’s and spread over a much larger area, with large differences 
between various American states.  
Selection and misclassification 
Reporting rates solves one methodological problem, by adjusting the count to the size of the 
population. However, the selection of those tested is critical for accurate estimation. In a 
given population (P), at a particular time, a subgroup (I) will have been infected, some of 
them will have tested positive (T), some may have symptoms (S), and some of these will 
have died (D). Many non-infected may have similar symptoms to Covid-19 cases, and the 
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infected I will exceed the symptomatic S, possibly by a large amount. If testing for Covid-19 
is done randomly, and the test has very high sensitivity and specificity, one can obtain 
reasonably valid estimates of the infected (I), the population attack rate (AR=I/P), and the 
infection fatality rate (IFR=D/I). But the current situation does not resemble this ideal 
condition. 
Accurate estimation of the AR and IFR depends on the testing strategy, the prevalence of 
infection, and the test sensitivity and specificity. Differences between countries or over time 
may merely reflect differences in selection for testing and in test performance, including  
(i) Only testing people with symptoms: unfortunately the test-positive rate among the 
symptomatic (TSR=T/S) and the diagnosed-case fatality rate (CFR=D/T) are inflated 
estimates of the population attack rate (I/P) and infection fatality rate (D/I). Consider 
that the reported case fatality rate (CFR) in Italy has been over 10%, but this may 
largely reflect that only symptomatic people (who tend to be older) are being tested 
(D/T, not D/I). Germany employs more widespread testing and has had an apparent 
case fatality rate below 2%. While some of this difference is due to case management, 
the huge difference shows that death counts and fatality rates among symptomatic 
cases are grossly inadequate for determining infection fatality. 
(ii) Test performance (sensitivity, specificity, predictive values) of the tests in the field 
are as yet largely unknown, and will vary across place and time. For example, even 
with near perfect specificity of a molecular test, due to technical errors there may be 
occasional false positives and considerable false negatives (due to difficulties in 
getting a good swab, differences in virus shedding over the disease course, specimen 
cross-contamination, etc). Consequently, the positive predictive value (PPV, the 
chance that a test positive is actually infected) will be poor in very low prevalence 
situations – e.g. when an epidemic is beginning, or when it is phasing out. Thus, if the 
test had 70% sensitivity and 99% specificity, but the prevalence of infection were 
only 3%, then the PPV of the test would be only 68%. This would make about one-
third of the reported cases false positives, increasing the estimated attack rate and 
reducing the case-fatality rate. 
The case of the United Kingdom 
The difficulties of drawing policy decisions from inadequate data are illustrated by the United 
Kingdom, which initially took a ‘wait for herd immunity’ approach, but is now taking 
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measures similar to other large European countries[1]. The change came because a report in 
March from Imperial College [2] used new data from Italy showing that the proportion of 
hospitalized patients needing intensive care was similar to that reported from China in 
January. If these estimates applied to the UK, the NHS would be overwhelmed and there 
would be about 250,000 deaths - similar to the UK death toll of the 1918/9 Spanish Flu. The 
Imperial College estimates were much lower when assuming the UK followed the isolation 
approach of other countries. However, a University of Oxford report explored other 
scenarios, one of which indicated there may already be substantial herd immunity and 
therefore the death toll was likely to be relatively low [3].  
These two sets of reports used essentially the same data, but fed different assumptions into 
the models and thus came to starkly different conclusions. The key difference was in the 
assumptions about the proportion of infections which have been undiagnosed, either because 
they were asymptomatic, or otherwise untested. Most have estimated the infection fatality 
rate to be about 1% (as in the Imperial College analyses) based on deaths among test 
positives (CFR=D/T) [4], whereas if there is a large pool of undiagnosed non-symptomatic 
infections, then the true rate (D/I) would be much lower.  
The need for surveillance 
We need testing strategies to estimate population numbers and rates of infection and death – 
and not just in people with symptoms or people testing positive. We also need accurate 
immunologic tests to see who has been infected and may have developed immunity. Ideally, 
surveillance would involve: 
1.  Repeated representative sampling of diverse parts of the population. This can be 
approximated if countries follow WHO’s recommendations with the caveat that the  
implications of results from test surveys depends on the stage of the epidemic [5]. 
Epidemic control requires detecting even minor symptoms, and testing of the 
immediate contacts of positives. Test-negatives also provide important information, 
e.g. about protective factors and false negatives. More representative testing would 
enable reasonable estimates of current reproduction numbers, as well as population 
prevalence; ideally this would be a continuous process throughout the epidemic. 
2. Validation data for each test brand, laboratory, and country since the tests cannot be 
identical in performance across sources and field administrators.  
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We will eventually get through this, but in the process the world will have changed. One 
positive change should be the recognition that we need good surveillance systems 
permanently in place for both infectious and chronic disease. Some conditions cannot be 
identified from routine health system data, and regular population surveys of both infectious 
and chronic diseases are needed. Surveillance and descriptive epidemiology remain essential 
foundations for sound health science and policy.  
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Table 1: Epidemiological concepts and statistics used in this paper  
Abbreviation Term  Formula 
P Population   
I Infected  
T Subgroup of testing positive  
S Subgroup with symptoms  
NS undiagnosed non-
symptomatic infections  
 
D Deaths  
Se Sensitivity True Positive Tests/Diseased  
Sp Specificity True Negative tests/Non-
Diseased 
AR Attack rate over a defined 
time period 
I/P 
CFR Diagnosed-case fatality rate D/T 
IFR Infection fatality rate D/I 
PPV Positive predictive value I/Positive Tests 
 
 
